Sirwan Niki Kha. Yasin Kianpour. Zakaria Faqe Hassan. Farhad Qamari. Reza Sadeghi. Ahmad Mahmoudi. Sorush Nasri. Kasra Rahmanjad. Sina Safari.

https://www.rudaw.net/english/categories/kurdistan/1078394

Nine killed, several injured in attack on Kurdish dissident group in Sulaimani

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - At least nine members of the Kurdish dissident group Komala Toilers of Kurdistan were killed and several others wounded in an attack involving six missiles on the group's base in Kurdistan Region's eastern Sulaimani province on Friday, a senior commander from the group told Rudaw, anticipating that the death toll would rise.

“Our main headquarters in Zirgwez was struck by six missiles,” the commander said, adding that preliminary figures show that at least eight people have been killed and a number of others injured.”

He added however that the number of casualties “is expected to rise as the fire is still burning [through the base] and the exact casualty figures are not yet clear."

Shortly after these remarks, the death toll rose to nine.

Meanwhile, Abdullah Azarbar, a member of Komala's politburo, blamed Tehran for the attack, telling Rudaw, "We were bombarded by Iran with six powerful and large missiles." 

Zirgwez is a town located in the southern part of Sulaimani and known for hosting camps belonging to Iranian-Kurdish opposition groups.

Later in the day, the Kurdistan Region Security Agency detailed that “a total of seven missiles” were fired - four at Zirgwez, one at Qasdri and two near Grdi Kopani villages in Sulaimani.

“A detailed investigation by our teams is ongoing to determine the human and material damages caused by the attacks,” the Agency added.

Information obtained by Rudaw also indicated that the targeted base in Zirgwez was housing at least 20 members who had recently joined the group. 

Earlier on Friday, several "powerful blasts" were heard in the area, Rudaw's Fazel Hawrami reported, likening the possibility of the area being targeted.

As of the time of this report, efforts to extinguish the fire caused by the attack were still ongoing.

In addition to the attack in Sulaimani, several drones were intercepted over the Kurdistan Region's capital, Erbil, in the early hours of Friday.

The Erbil-based Counter-Terrorism Directorate confirmed that "between 4:19 and 5:25 am [local time], [US-led] Coalition forces intercepted and shot down eight bomb-laden drones in the skies over Erbil," adding that the incidents left no casualties."

This is a developing story... 

https://x.com/RojhelatInfo_En/status/2077760773690921464/photo/1

Warisheh Moradi (Wirêşe Muradî), a Kurdish political prisoner and member of the East Kurdistan Free Women's Society (KJAR), has been indefinitely banned from making phone calls and receiving family visits by order of Judge Abolqasem Salavati of Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court.

The decision was reportedly made a few days after Moradi refused to appear before Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court. According to an informed source, Judge Salavati ordered the indefinite suspension of her family visits and phone calls in response to her refusal.

Moradi has previously been denied phone calls and family visits several times, including for supporting the "No to Execution Tuesdays" campaign.

Moradi has been in detention since August 2023. She was previously sentenced to death, but in December 2025, Iran's Supreme Court overturned the sentence due to procedural flaws in the case and referred it back to Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court for a retrial.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verisheh_Moradi

Verisheh Moradi is a Kurdish political prisoner and women's rights activist sentenced to death by the state of Iran. She was arrested by the Ministry of Intelligence) in Sanandaj on 1 August 2023 and imprisoned in Evin Prison in Tehran. In February 2024, Moradi was formally charged with baghi) armed rebellion against the state, due to her association with Kurdish opposition groups. In November 2024, Branch Fifteen of the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Tehran sentenced Moradi to death.

Does anyone know about this specific style? Name of it? Ive seen this in many old pictures. This photo is surprisingly of an Armenian man from Mush region.

I’m currently looking for native Kurdish speakers for a quick and fun UGC (User Generated Content) video project. 🗣️🎬

• The Task: Record a short video (around 45-60 seconds) in Kurdish. 📹⏱️
• Requirements: High-quality smartphone camera, natural acting, and the ability to shoot in a single continuous take (no editing needed on your side). 📱👌

His Facebook post: https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02H1S3dpQs

We and most of our relatives speak Turkmen at home, but most of us have not denied being Kurds.

We decided to take DNA test in our family to be sure.

When the results came out, we genuinely couldn’t believe our eyes:

88.9% Kurds

9.5% Turkish

1.6% Southern Italy

This means that our Kurdishness is no less than that of many Kurdish people, even in some mountainous and Kurdish-speaking areas.

We must also know that no one belongs entirely (100%) to just one nation, because the history of nations has had a long mixture and relationship.

I believe there are some people who consider themselves Turks or Arabs, but if they are offered a test, even if someone else pays for it, they may not be willing to take it.

In my opinion, the reason is often fear; Fear that the results will not match the belief they have held for years. Some people are unsure of their identity, afraid that new information will change their opinions.

But science is not something to be feared. If someone is sure of their opinion, they should not be afraid to find out more facts and information. Ultimately, truth always deserves clarity and recognition.

His biography: https://kurdcollect.com/index.php/%D9%85%D8%AD

Why is it so normalized here in Kurdistan for products to be sold in shady condition, and why does no one seem to care? You pay full price, if not above market price, for something that could very well have been opened or used and then poorly resealed in dirty tape.

Almost every time I purchase something new, the packaging looks damaged, the seal looks tampered with, or the product itself looks dirty or poorly handled. It sometimes feels like every product has been opened and used/tested somewhere before being sold.

Ordering through apps is very convenient, but it is also such a gamble because you have no idea what condition the product will arrive in. I miss opening something that looks brand new and smelling the factory smell, but that experience is non-existent here at least in the Iraqi side of Kurdistan.

Maybe I am in the minority, but this genuinely annoys me. Has anyone here worked in retail and can explain why this is the way it is?

like ex: im from zakho and don’t understand a lick of sorani. it sounds very rounded, smooth, and monotone. also reminds me (based on how it sounds ad vibes) of persian, french, arabic.

wondered what yall think of bahdini or kurmanji as a whole

Sılav, friends

I want to know where most Kurds in this sub are from and their age. Nothing important, I just want to know because I'm curious about other parts of Kurdistan that I have never visited. Also, whether or not we have mostly young people or adults in the sub.

So, what is your age, and which part of Kurdistan are you from?

Spas Dikim

How Turkey’s Parliamentary Peace Commission Failed its Democratic Promises

by Nisan Alıcı & Güley Bor

Parliaments can aid peacebuilding and transitional justice processes not only through their legislative functions but also as democratic mechanisms where different views over conflicted periods are represented, contributing to dialogue and social consensus on peaceful co-existence. In this blog post, we focus on one such parliamentary mechanism in Turkey – the National Solidarity, Fraternity and Democracy Commission (hereafter, the Commission) established under the Grand National Assembly of Turkey – specifically regarding civil society participation, gender equality, and transitional justice demands. We draw on findings from our September 2025 report on the Commission as an ad-hoc mechanism, published by the DEMOS Research Collective, as well as recent developments in the peace process.

Turkey’s New Peace Process and the Commission

The peace process between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has been progressing slowly, with few concrete steps by the government until now. Announced unexpectedly by the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) coalition partner, the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli in October 2024, the process has largely unfolded through top-down and backdoor negotiations, with clear tensions on expectations from this process. The government has adopted a strictly securitised conceptualisation of peace, what they call ‘Terror-free Turkey’, focused entirely on demilitarisation. This is an extension of the Turkish state’s historical securitisation of the so-called Kurdish issue and the current government’s intensified crackdown on the Kurdish political movement amidst a decade of worsening authoritarianism. In contrast, the PKK has put forward a vision of ‘Peace and Democratic Society’, seeking to address certain inequalities that led to the conflict. Despite these fundamental disagreements, negotiations are proceeding, albeit slowly. Following jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s call to lay down arms in February 2025 and the party’s decision to disarm and disband in May 2025, a group of PKK members symbolically burned weapons in southern Kurdistan with civil society representatives present as observers in a historic ceremony in July 2025.

Partly responding to calls to ground and secure the process democratically, the Commission was established in August 2025 as an informal parliamentary body, consisting of MPs from all but one parties represented in the Parliament. Per its bylaws, the Commission’s objectives were ‘to completely remove terrorism from Turkey’s agenda, strengthen social cohesion, reinforce our national unity and brotherhood, and undertake efforts in the areas of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law’ through working on legislative proposals and informing the broader public on the process.

As the only tangible mechanism through which civil society could contribute, the Commission raised expectations that this peace process could promote democratisation after all. Yet its mission and working methods remained unclear, even to its own members. Established almost a year into the process, it offered an official but invitation-only channel for civil society and conflict-affected groups to present their views, inevitably raising questions about access and inclusion.

Following 21 sessions in which a total of 137 persons were heard, the Commission concluded its work in February 2026 – a surprisingly short amount of time for a Commission with such ambitious goals. Its concluding report reflected the ‘terror-free Turkey’ framework, with its language heavily securitised; it provided broad recommendations regarding legislative proposals for the peace process, such as demilitarisation, reintegration, and legal assurances to those involved in the negotiations. Importantly, the report only briefly touched upon democratisation demands, recommending (in a total of four pages) strengthening fundamental rights and freedoms and reforming the penal execution regime and the counter-terrorism framework, among others. It made no mention of cultural rights, for instance. The report highlighted a ‘unique and national perspective,’ supported by government representatives’ repeated emphasis on a home-grown process with zero interference from third party countries, mediators, or guarantors. While locally grounded and context-specific processes are essential, this framing also suggests an attempt to retain total political control over the process through an authoritarian conflict management approach, limiting broader participation and scrutiny. Despite being framed as a home-grown process, there has been little meaningful space for community actors, victims, and survivors to shape its direction.

The Commission’s work reflects this limitation. It failed to generate social ownership of the Commission’s work or the peace process, rather functioning largely as a platform to collect demands without concrete next steps. The lack of meaningful participation, insufficient attention to gender, and the failure to address transitional justice demands undermined the Commission’s legitimacy and led to a missed opportunity to socialise this peace process.

What is Missing from the Commission’s Work?

Firstly, the participation of affected groups and communities and civil society remained symbolic. While the Commission heard a range of voices, it excluded others and failed to ensure meaningful participation. The criteria used to determine invitees was unclear, with the final list appearing to represent a middle ground. For instance, among the first to be invited were organisations of soldiers and law enforcement and their families, as well as the Saturday Mothers/People (movement of activists and families of the forcibly disappeared) and the Peace Mothers (movement by mostly Kurdish mothers who lost their children in the conflict). However, the Commission did not permit Peace Mother Nezahat Teke to address the Commission in her mother tongue, reproducing structural inequalities against the Kurdish language and identity. Meanwhile, LGBTI+ organisations were not invited despite having been recommended by some political parties and the LGBTI+ movement’senthusiastic engagement with the process, which is unsurprising given the government’s targeting of this community. These examples demonstrate the boundaries of acceptable inclusion within the process.

Secondly, attention to gender equality was lacking both in the Commission’s structure and outputs. Although women’s and LGBTI+ movements have consistently asserted their role in peacebuilding and insisted on being included from the outset, only 9 of the 51 Commission members were women, and while some women’s and youth organisations participated in hearings, the final report makes no reference to gender equality or a gendered perspective on conflict and peacebuilding. This absence is not simply a matter of representation but reflects a broader rejection to integrate gender as a substantive dimension of disarmament and the peace process amidst the government’s worsening anti-gender politics.

Thirdly, the Commission barely engaged with transitional justice demands, even with regards to enforced disappearances, one of the issues raised by victims-survivors of the conflict in their initial submissions. The Saturday Mothers, during the 5th session, demanded truth and justice for their forcibly disappeared relatives, accountability of perpetrators, and the establishment of a truth commission under the Commission. Despite the wide media coverage of this session and the significance of these demands in building a democratic future for the country, the final report made no reference to transitional justice mechanisms, truth commissions, or dealing with the past. This represents one of the Commission’s most significant shortcomings, especially given the centrality of truth and justice demands among those most affected by the conflict.

Conclusion

Although the Commission initially raised expectations that injustices at the heart of the conflict would be publicly and substantively addressed, its work remained limited. Rather than transforming participation into influence, it appears to have functioned largely as a mechanism to appease communities affected by the conflict and respond to broader social opposition to authoritarianism. Despite the opportunities that this formal space for participation presented for peacebuilding, the Commission showed once again that formalistic participation does not equal meaningful inclusion or impact. The Commission appears to have failed the objectives it set for itself to strengthen social cohesion and promote democratisation.

This also raises questions about the broader parliamentary and political context. The effectiveness of such ad hoc mechanisms depends on political will and genuine openness to pluralism. In the current context of systemic weakening of the opposition, evidenced most recently by the politically motivated court decision to remove Özgür Özel, the elected chair of the main opposition party, and the crackdown on social movements opposing the NATO Summit held in Ankara, the Commission reflects the limits of parliamentary involvement in peace negotiations by a government with no political will for democratisation. In the meantime, the key legal framework for the advancement of disarmament is expected to be brought to the parliament before the summer recess. This new legislation is likely to affect thousands of individuals including the PKK fighters, those imprisoned for PKK-related charges, and those in exile, therefore will mark a crucial milestone in the peace process. However, there are concerns that the government’s proposed legislation may have a narrow scope on laying down arms rather than paving the way for democratisation, pointing yet again to differing expectations and conceptualisations.

Considering the failures of the Commission that was tasked with contributing to social cohesion, democracy, and freedom, there appears little prospect that the proposed legislation will account for ways forward for democracy and social peace. Without civil society taking ownership and victim-survivor groups becoming leading actors, this ‘unique and national’ process risks remaining confined to a top-down framework, which will hinder any possibility of achieving sustainable peace.

It was 1991 and I was on my first assignment for National Geographic. I had pitched a story on the Kurdish people, the largest ethnic group in the world without a nation of their own, and I would be covering 8 countries over 26 weeks.
I was well into the story, having documented the return of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey when I received a disturbing call from my editor. She expressed concern about where the story was going and threatened to pull the plug if I couldn't find a stronger angle with my coverage. I was beside myself and facing what felt like a failure of a magnitude I could not process. Thankfully, she was a wise photo editor and suggested I return to the unspoken capital of Kurdistan, Diyarbakir, Turkey, which was hundreds of miles away.
Upon my return, I decided to spend time with a Kurdish human rights lawyer. He invited me to join him in attending what was then called "terrorist court," where they tried Kurdish militants who were suspected of being members of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). The PKK was, and still is, a separatist group fighting a war against Turkey.
Once seated in the gallery, facing this scene, one of his clients was brought into the dock with soldiers stationed behind her. In a brief moment, she raised her head in defiance and I was able to click off about 6 frames before the judge ordered me to sit down. I was prepared for him to ask for my film, so I bent down, pulled the roll out of my camera, stuck it in my sock, and loaded a fresh roll. Thankfully, he never asked for my film.
The magazine published this image as a double spread, and my story made the cover. As a result, the 1992 issue of the magazine was banned in Turkey, and they changed their policy denying access to these courts moving forward. This image, which was published worldwide, went on to win awards and became the most iconic image of my young career.

Credit and body text from: https://www.instagram.com/edkashi/

https://youtu.be/uldwn-YEVJM?t=2000

Twelve years after being abducted by ISIS during the group's assault on Shingal (Sinjar), Yazidi survivor Khatem Ghanem has transformed one of the darkest chapters of her life into a mission to help others rebuild theirs.

https://npasyria.com/en/139174/

‘Unleash the Kurds’: Trump yet to play major card against Iranian regime

Jewish News Syndicate Editor in Chief Jonathan S Tobin claims US President Donald Trump has a lot of cards he can play against the Iranian regime. “There are a lot of things the United States can do – to unleash the Kurds to attack the Iranian regime in the north of Iran,” Mr Tobin told Sky News Digital Presenter Gabriella Power. “There are a lot of cards that the United States is yet to play against the regime.”

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/unleash-the-kurds-trump-yet-to-play-major-card-against-iranian-regime/video/24d5929c2039a13c2f0c1e4efc7d4d90

Kurdistan's electricity ministry confirms production shortfall following today's Khor Mor gas field suspension; Sulaimani-area supply the hardest hit

Kewser Derwish from Amuda (Rojava) has tended her family's garden since childhood, growing vegetables and fruit trees while preserving Kurdish farming traditions