The Mexican Cuirassiers occupy a fascinating place in military history. During the Mexican American war, they were visually spectacular, psychologically intimidating, and carried the prestige of old European cavalry traditions but they were also a symbol of the tension between military theory inherited from the Napoleonic age and the realities of North American warfare. One of the coolest things I’ve come across when studying this war

After independence from Spain in 1821, Mexico inherited much of Spain’s military tradition. The officer corps admired European armies, especially France, and many Mexican commanders believed that a powerful cavalry arm was essential for a respectable modern army.

The Mexican Army maintained several types of cavalry: Lancers, Presidiales, Dragoons, and Cuirassiers

The cuirassiers were meant to be Mexico’s elite shock cavalry, like the equivalent of European heavy cavalry such as French cuirassiers under Napoleon. Their purpose was not simply aggressive combat effectiveness. They were also a statement of national prestige: Mexico was presenting itself as a civilized nation with a professional army comparable to European powers.

They were equipped wearing metal breastplates, crested helmets, and carrying cavalry sabers, pistols, and sometimes carbines.

American soldiers often commented on the impressive appearance of Mexican cavalry. One American observer famously compared them to knights from an earlier age. BUT appearance and battlefield utility were two different things.

The problem: they were built for Europe, not Mexico

For example, during the battle of Buena Vista They achieved some success early, and their appearance caused alarm among American troops. However, American artillery and disciplined infantry formations broke up the assaults.

Mexican cuirassiers were built around the European Napoleonic model of heavy cavalry, designed for open battlefields where armored horsemen could deliver decisive charges. However, Mexico’s terrain, limited resources, and political instability made maintaining such elite cavalry difficult.

The rugged landscapes of northern Mexico often restricted their mobility, while American artillery, disciplined infantry, and evolving firearms reduced the effectiveness of traditional cavalry charges. Although they were impressive, intimidating, and symbolically represented Mexico’s attempt to match European military standards, they were ultimately a force from an older era fighting in a changing age of warfare

A bit tied to my last question on US and LSCO vs COIN, but I saw some comments regarding the commitment of US forces towards drones for their COIN missions in the War on Terror, and saw one made mention of how they keep getting shot down.

So I wanted to ask, What’s Up With All The MQ-9s Being Shot Down?

Obviously the most recent news on MQ-9 loss is the Iran conflict, but that breaks Rule 1 for One Year Discussion, so I’d like to see see if we can cap it to last year, as there are news of the Houthi in Yemen downing at least 15 MQ-9s, likely more.

But is there some logic to this? The way it sounds, the US keeps sending MQ-9 into situations known shoot down MQ-9, so there must be some rationale there.

Some way I’ve heard this is 1) that is literally part of a drone’s job to be sent to dangerous areas to be an attritable asset that we can tolerate a loss versus a manned aircraft; 2) the need for recon and ISR on that particular spot is so important to worth the risk of losing drones over that; or 3) this is a way to decommission all of the excess and old drones in Us inventory.

The Dutch and British East India companies had formidable navies and ground forces to the point of challenging established nations. Can you give other instances throughout history of this happening? And why did it stop being this way? Why are corporations nowadays averse to hard power?

I genuinely believe we'll all go back to that era. Mark my words in 30 years APPLE Inc will be bombing rebels in Chile with Facebook guided bombs from a B-1b Raider.

Given the amount of attacks on merchant ships in the 2020s from the Black Sea to the Red Sea/Strait of Hormuz, what was the thinking on the matter regarding attrition towards maritime shipping among the naval powers? Compared to the First and Second World War along with the Tanker Wars of the 1980s in tandem with globalization of shipping, what was the expectation within the Merchant Navies of various countries regarding their role in war?

Edit: title should have “when the nazis realized they were going to lose”

To those who’ve read on Napoleon, quite common is the idea presented that Napoleon garnered the utmost respect and motivation of his troops. That, at Lodi, Napoleon himself got stuck in; aiming cannons, even getting muddy. Then when ordering a near suicidal charge on the only bridge in town, his troops set forward without a question. Even later, when (correct me if I am wrong) during the retreat to Paris, at one point Napoleons generals had to show a young boy how to load a gun mid fight. This is not Napoleon, but I present it as another example of the French generals of the time being seemingly quite magnanimous. The epoch of the Russian revolution, however, presented an army on a scale never seen before — and so it is hard to imagine that many troops fighting would have any contact with Napoleon himself. Also ignoring the fact most weren’t French of course.

I read a lot of this online, where one supposedly fears their oppnents so much they give them nicknames and officers tell them to avoid fighting them. You usually see a lot of people parrotting these in comment sections of YouTube videos IG reels.

Examples include:

- US Marines supposedly being called devil dogs by Germans

- an NVA general supposedly telling his men to "avoid fighting the chicken men, for it will end in defeat" in reference to the US 101st Airborne.

-German Paratroopers supposedly being called Green Devils for how ferocious they are.

How true are these? Are there any sources or evidence that would suggest these units are more feared by their enemies to warrant them their nicknames? Or are these nicknames more like insults and not made out of fear? Or are they propaganda made to boost morale of a unit?

Notes

The Cavalry Brigade was part of the Cavalry Division but acted independently during the initial phase of the war.

The III Infantry Brigade had its units dispersed and never operated as an independent formation. It was disbanded very early on.

The IV Infantry Brigade was expanded into a division and became the XV.

The V Infantry Brigade was disbanded and its battalions reinforced other regiments.

The XVI Infantry Brigade was expanded into a division and became the XVI.

A VII Infantry Brigade may have been formed to cover the Nestos area according to pre-war plans but it never operated independently and probably was disbanded or formed the core of one of the newly raised divisions.

The XX Infantry Division was actually numbered in Arabic numerals ("20") instead of Latin ones. The same is true for the XXI Infantry Brigade ("21").

The XIX Mechanized Division was the first major mechanized unit of the Greek Army. It was formed from the Motorised Regiment of the Cavalry Division and supplied with British equipment and captured Italian tanks and vehicles.

In anticipation of the German attack three divisions (XVIII,XIX,XX) and two brigades (Nestos, Evros) were raised but had severe shortages in artillery, transportation and equipment.

Following the collapse of the front during the German Invasion the Cavalry Division and the XXI Infantry Brigade were committed to fill the gaps against the Germans in Western Macedonia.

Trying to make sense of the Army Corps and Army Sections;

During peacetime the army was organised into 5 Army Corps numbered in Latin (I,II,III,IV,V) or sometimes Greek numerals (A,B,C,D,E as they appear translated) and three independent divisions (two with the final revision) all under the General HQ.

There were also at least two smaller Division Group Commands one in Macedonia and one formed ("K") during the Greek counteroffensive.

The WW2 Greek equivalent to Field Armies were the Army Sections, these were the

Epirus Army Section (EAS or TSI in Greek).

Western Macedonia Army Section (WMAS - TSDM).

Eastern Macedonia Army Section (EMAS - TSAM) originally called Kavala Army Section.

Central Macedonia Army Section (CMAS - TSKM) originally called Thrace Army Section before being relocated west. It was a corps-sized formation.

Greek planning divided the Albanian Front in three sectors; Epirus, Pindus and W. Macedonia. These were initially defended by the VIII Divison, the Pindus Detachment and the IX Division (the later two under II Corps).

Following the declaration of war WMAS and KAS were formed. WMAS included the II and III Army Corps while the KAS included the local division group and IV Corps. I and V Corps as well as the general reserve remained directly subordinate to the General HQ. (I originally wanted to include which divisions belonged to which corps but they were constantly shuffled around)

WMAS led the Greek counteroffensive (with II Corps in the Pindus Sector and III Corps in W. Macedonia) while I Army Corps assumed control of the Epirus Sector. As Bulgaria remained neutral units from the Bulgarian front were relocated west. V Corps was essentially disbanded and its staff joined K Division group that became part of WMAS. KAS was renamed EMAS and was soon merged with IV Corps. By the end of November II Corps became directly subordinate to the General HQ while K Group was renamed V Corps. Consequently in December the Albanian front had from the sea to the Yugoslav border, the I and II Corps directly under General HQ and the V and III Corps under WMAS while EMAS (former IV Corps) covered the border with Bulgaria.

In anticipation to the German attack, two new Army Sections were formed. The EAS with the I and II Army Corps in Albania (as a result there were now two Field Armies in Albania the EAS and the WMAS) and the TAS. This later was reformed in Central Macedonia as the CMAS and together with the newly arrived 1st Australian (renamed ANZAC) Corps formed Force W that covered the Haliacmon Line. V Corps was disbanded again in March and its units directly subordinated to WMAS. In the final days when the army in Epirus was encircled, WMAS was disbanded and its units all now under the III Corps were subordinated to EAS. Two major reshuffles in the Greek leadership took place in February and March which further complicated things since WMAS and III Corps were commanded by the same person. The same was true for EMAS and IV Corps.

English sources for practical reasons group the Greek units in the Italian front as the 1st/Epirus Army and those in the German front as the 2nd/Macedonia Army.

The Greek forces during the battle of Crete fought dispersed as part of the CreForce and didnt constitute their own seperate Division or Brigade.

Concerning the Free Greek Army. The I Brigade was formed in June 41, while the II Brigade in May 42. The I Brigade fought in the battle of El Alamein. Plans for a III Brigade and an overal Greek Division were cancelled after a widespread pro-EAM mutiny in the spring of 44. Both units were disbanded and a III Mountain Brigade was formed during the summer from politically reliable personnel. The Brigade fought in Rimini in the Gothic Line in Italy and the battle of Athens in Greece. In late 42 the Sacred Band/Squadron was formed as a special forces unit. It participated in raids and operations in Libya, Tunisia and the Dodecanese. In 1944 it became a Regiment and continued operations against the isolated German garrisons until the end of the war.

Sources
The Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German war of 1940-1941
The History of the organisation of the Greek Army (1821-1954)

Despite immense pressure and a huge asymmetry of resources, organized insurgencies can grumble on for an extremely long time. Philippine communists for decades, the IRA for 30+ years, FARC, Mao. But then, some of the time, insurgency just fizzles into nothing.

Like the Chechen wars of the 1990s and 2000s. Working from first principles, you'd probably expect it to turn into a forever war. It just didn't.

Many insurgencies lasted longer and were able to inflict a higher level of violence and stay more coherent. In comparison to other conflicts, it's odd that Chechen paramilitary activity was not much more lasting.

• It had deep stockpiles of modern military equipment, beyond the wildest dreams of most insurgents

• It had multiple causus bellis - secular independence, religious freedom, anti-colonialism that might have given it broad political appeal

• It was surrounded on multiple sides by hard, mountainous terrain ideal for smuggling or concealment, as well as a porous land border with the occupier

• Chechnya won the first Chechen war against Russia, meaning the possibility of succeeding was not utterly unreasonable

• It was full of men with existing military experience at all levels of command in formal military institutions

• They were mad. Chechens have a deep, centuries long and extremely violent ethnic grudge against Russia. Due to serious atrocities including being repeatedly massacred for centuries, including flattening the capital in the 1990s, it's hard to not believe they were greatly polarized.

• It was culturally, religiously and ethnically distinct from its occupier.

So what gives? Why was the problem relatively "solved" so quickly?

Or rather is it 90% about battlefield experience?
Are there examples of people with no prior combat experience excelling in battle due to their training?
Or is the majority of it forgotten once the chaos and mayhem of real combat begins?
It’s not like you can “spar” as someone can do in MMA, where you can an authentic feel for what it’s like to actually fight hand to hand .

Forgotten Armour: Tank Warfare in Burma

Jack Bowsher, 2024

I picked up this book wanting to fill a gaping hole in my knowledge about the employment of British & Commonwealth armour in the pacific during the Second World War. It's a great read about a previously underappreciated theatre.

The book covers the northbound withdrawal by British and Indian forces in 1942 and the later southern push by reinforced allied forces, ending in Rangoon in 1945.

The emphasis firmly remains on the use of armour in very dense jungle and how critical it was during both the withdrawal and advance of allied troops. There is also no small of operational-level analysis throughout and plenty of coverage on the incredible logistical trials required to move men and armour through such difficult terrain.

It's also interesting to read the author rehabilitate the reputation of two much-decried armoured platforms - the M3 Stuart and the M3 Lee.

The Stuart 'Honey' proved to be incredibly reliable - so much so British soldiers had some difficulty permanently disabling their own engines during their retreat. They also proved very effective in the anti-armour role, helped along by the woeful Japanese armour employed in the region.

The Lee was also a reliable platform - especially given the models used in the Pacific were pretty clapped out from service in Africa.

It was also interesting to read about the Lee, who's seven man crew and high profile greatly assisted with the crew maintaining 360 security in the dense jungle environment, the importance of which is emphasised by the action that awarded Trooper Vernon Jenkins the Military Medal:

As they passed the village, 4 Troop set the town ablaze with tracer fire. The rest of the squadron were engaging some Japanese to their front in some thick scrub, when two Japanese soldiers broke cover and climbed the rear of Cornaby’s Lee tank. One of them was later identified as the commander of the Japanese 5th Medium Artillery Regiment, the other an unidentified other rank.

Cornaby was directing his tank’s fire from his open turret hatch, unaware of the Japanese officer, who had reached the turret from the engine deck. ‘They were not noticed by anyone until the officer was in the act of plunging his sword into Captain Cornaby’.⁠6 There was a clatter of Browning machine gun fire, and bullets pinged off the rear of the Lee. The Japanese other rank tumbled to the ground killed, but the officer was apparently unhurt and started climbing into the turret, immediately killed the 37mm gunner.

The 37mm loader, Trooper Vernon Jenkins, saw what was happening, and was now in a fight for his life in the tiny confines of a Lee tank’s turret with the rest of the crew oblivious to his desperate struggle. He awkwardly pulled his pistol from his belt holster, and fired wildly across the 37mm gun’s loading mechanism, wounding the Japanese officer. The Japanese officer, fighting with all of the fanatical spirit expected of Bushido⁠ , continued to fight hand to hand with Jenkins.

Luckily for Jenkins, whose pistol was now empty, there was clearly no space for the Japanese officer to swing his samurai sword. Jenkins managed to reach into the gunner’s belt and pull out their pistol, firing three rounds that finally killed the Japanese officer. The three bodies were now lying in the floor of the turret and might jam the mechanism if they moved it too much. The tank reported their predicament, and under cover of the rest of the troop, they withdrew. The rest of the squadron cleared the nearby villages, and destroyed a 47mm AT gun, although two tanks were burned out in the process.

The Lee's 37mm and 75mm cannons were also used to great impact, often used in a specific order against a single target in a manner I hadn't heard of before:

Out of this though, a system was developed, built on the accuracy of the tanks’ 75mm guns. After reconnaissance of a target to try and locate as many bunkers as possible, artillery and aerial bombardment would now aim to clear vegetation in the area rather than supress the occupants. This would make the bunkers easier to spot before the artillery moved their fire to suppress other bunkers on nearby features.

Ley then drilled the 25th Dragoons in a method that would be shared across the entire Indian Army and would save innumerable lives. If needed, the tanks would clear any more vegetation with HE, then switch to AP to soften the earth around a bunker’s loophole – a trick Ley had trialled on Razabil. They would switch back to HE with delayed action fuses, and using the Lee’s 75mm gun’s superb accuracy, fire directly through the loophole into the bunker, and hopefully blow it apart and kill the occupants.

The 75mm’s HE always burst forward because it was a direct fire weapon, whereas artillery HE dropped down with a wider spread in all directions when it exploded. This meant the infantry could confidently close to within ten yards of the bunker and give a prearranged signal. The tanks would switch back to AP and machine gun fire and continue firing to keep any survivor’s heads down, only ceasing their fire as the infantry made the final assault with grenades, sub-machine guns, bayonets, and kukris.

Overall it's a great read. Like any book that features battles of maneuver more maps would have been helpful, but it's great to see a light shone on a little-acknowledged corner of the allied war effort in WW2.

For starters, a lot less radio chatter, and a lot less encryption. A lot less armies marching around to be seen by scouts or satellites. I have about two parts I want to know most of all.

1. What's the information the counterinsurgency looking for? I know that insurgencies tend to have a cell structure to minimize damage. But there has to be some limits, aren't there? Something that any counterinsurgency will use as a lynchpin.

2. What's the information that the insurgency is looking for? Names of the spies amongst their midst? Where the regime keeps their prisoners?

I don't understand, at least post 1991, who all these blue water navies, spy organizations and internationally mobile armies are for. Its not other countries so it could be pirates, terrorists, organized criminal networks and rebel groups but I just don't believe that. The piracy epidemic of Somalia does not warrant even 1% of the resources various powers allocate towards combating them. There are billions missing.

If all these governments and militaries aren't fighting peer level forces or involved in large scale domestic enforcement (martial law) then I really do struggle to understand why militaries in the post cold war era are so stretched out

Who is everybody fighting?

One common sentiment I’ve seen in places in regards to the Russo-Ukraine war is that the War On Terror and COIN operations that the United States and NATO allies have been involved in since 2001 has “spoiled” them in what to expect in modern warfare in a large scale conventional warfare.

This is especially so with the United States where I’ve heard they’ve been impacted in ways like insurgents having no way to contest them in artillery and air dominance or other conventional ways that their practices in FOB preparation and fortifications and other such organization had languished compared to the sophisticated setup we’ve seen both the Ukrainians and Russians build in their frontlines, or how US and NATO soldiers always operated with assumptions of artillery and air superiority that there wasn’t much training on how to handle situations when neither of those are true.

So I gotta ask. Did the War On Terror and COIN operations involved with that conflict create a “distraction” that impacted ability to handle conventional warfare? I was thinking even if learning how to handle a peer adversary may have languished, that doesn’t mean everything necessarily languished the same way, like I’m sure logistics was quite taxed trying to maintain forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Probably one I can definitely see impacted is budget prioritization, which would have gone more to programs to support COIN operations than preparing for LSCO

I didn't see and heard anything else about those two

I'm trying to write down a scene where several IFV's, helicopters, are launching at attack on the base of rebels/ insurgents, before they themselves are destroyed by rescue party.

What exactly should I look out for when trying to write this? Considering that it's a sweep, they're trying to both get all the enemy at once, and get prisoners for intelligence. Anything else?

I know that in the Interwar years promotions was incredibly rare and slow moving (at least in regard to reading the background of Evans Carlson). Not sure about in recent decades which got me thinking.

I know it's vague but during peacetime what's leading promotions of junior officers as they steadily move up? During peacetime could someone easily miss out on promotions?

From Latin America to Japan, armies were still modeled on the French army, and French officers trained local forces.

On one hand, you've the quintessential image of the German home front as a rabid mob foaming at the mouth to die for Hitler, fighting to the very bitter end even when all was lost at Koenigsberg, Courland, Seelow Height, Berlin, etc. On the other hand, you had discussions about how the German population were war weary by 1942 even with all the news of victory during Barbarossa, how Goebbel's war propagandas were shunned, etc.

So, how enthusiastic was the German home front in WW2? And how did they compare to the German home front in WW1?

I was recently in Oregon for business, but I extended my stay for a day to go to the Oregon Museum of Science and Industry. They had a pretty amazing tour of the USS Blueback (SS-581). The tour guide gave us a lot of information, but I want to learn more. Is there anything I can read beyond the usual Google-able stuff to learn more about the Blueback's missions, overall role in the Navy, etc? It was a fascinating experience to actually see the interior of a submarine.

Out of the WP armies, who were considered the most capable to the least reliable?

The Ming Dynasty was one of the earliest and earnest users of gunpowder weaponry that might've rivaled contemporary European armies of the time. Yet, when the Qing (well they weren't proclaimed yet though I'll refer to them for simplicity) began their conquests they seemingly manage to routinely defeat Ming armies with little to no gunpowder weaponry, for example the battle of Sarhu using traditional weapons such as bows and sabres. As far as I know the Ming was actually attempting to fit their armies with arquebuses seeing the utility of the weapon during the Imjin War used by the Japanese. Korea also falls suit, but also seemingly can't couldn't stand up to the Qing.

Why did the Ming/Korea perform so poorly against the Qing despite being early gunpowder adopters?

For the Marine Nationale, I think I heard on a Drach video that the Richelieu was just finishing, Jean Bart was still being finished and the Alsace-class was being designed.

In a warzone what would a cook or mechanic be expected to do during a military operation or combat patrol?